Responsible for the welfare of beneficiaries, pension funds have many tasks and functions. Consequently, their governance and regulation are issues of public concern with direct bearing on the interests of stakeholders and ultimately the performance of Anglo-American financial markets. Nominally subject to common law expectations regarding proper trustee behavior, also important are statutory requirements regarding the equitable treatment of beneficiaries and the management of assets and liabilities. At one level, discretion is an essential attribute of the trust institutiontrustees act on behalf of others not so well placed to manage their own long-term welfare because of lack of knowledge and/or competence. At another level, pension funds are presumably regulated by a well-defined purpose-the welfare of beneficiaries. In this paper, I look at the internal governance of pension funds emphasizing codes of practice, the rules and procedures for decision-making, and trustee competence and expertise.
Introduction
Pension funds are remarkable institutions. In the Anglo-American world, public and private pension funds provide employer-sponsored pension benefits (including defined benefit, defined contribution, and hybrid schemes). These are vital supplementary institutions given the modest value of most countries' social security benefits (see Emmerson 2003 and Munnell 2003) . Charged with the responsibility of protecting and, in some cases, insuring beneficiaries' promised retirement income, pension funds are institutions that must be governed.
1 Golden-rules such as the exclusive benefit rule do not always resolve the dilemmas, conflicts of interest, and reasonable doubts over the proper course of action (Clark 2004) . One goal of this paper is to explain why this is the case-those knowledgeable of pension funds and related institutions will readily acknowledge this fact of life.
2 Those more removed from the practice of decisionmaking in trust institutions and drawn to parsimonious recipes of institutional form in economic theory may find the argument contentious (compare with Jensen 2000) .
Historically, trustees have had considerable discretion (in the scope of decision making)
when exercising their responsibilities (in protecting the welfare of beneficiaries). Given the covenant or mandate of each fund when established, and given the presumption in favor of supervision as opposed to direct regulation, trustees have wide-ranging powers consistent with the English common-law trust institution (Langbein 1997) . Discretion with responsibility provides an opportunity for plan-specific efficient and equitable solutions to retirement income provision, perhaps more so than if the state were to directly regulate plan decisions. Over the twentieth century, however, legislation became more intrusive with regard to trustee responsibilities and the scope of discretion was 1 /. In this paper, the term "governance" is used to refer to the formal mechanisms by which an institution makes decisions, is held accountable to its stakeholders and beneficiaries, and acts in accordance with public and private standards. This matches an OECD definition of pension fund governance which involves "a robust, process-oriented decision-making framework" including administrative and oversight functions as well due regard to the investment of pension fund assets (Galer 2002, 62) . /. See, for example, the essays on pension fund governance published by AMP (a financial services company) in their Insights magazine (www.amp.com.au). In a brief editorial (June 2003, p. 3), John Evans suggests that current interest in pension fund governance reflects growing unease about the responsiveness of pension fund officials to stakeholder interests.
narrowed with respect to the public interest in pension security and equity (Blake 2003) .
The scope of discretion however foreshadows the principal-agent problem just as trustee responsibility could be understood in terms of the moral hazard problem.
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The governance of trustee decision-making is a crucial issue for the integrity of private pensions and the provision of pension benefits whether defined benefit, defined contribution, or some hybrid version thereof (Clark 2003a) .
Much is expected of pension funds, in part because of their importance as institutional investors in national and global financial markets. In the aftermath of the dot.com boom, bubble and bust, academic and policy commentators have raised doubts about the skills and expertise of pension fund trustees. Shiller (2002) , for example, suggested that the herd behavior of institutional investors combined with the use of benchmarks measuring the relative performance of pension funds contributed to the escalation of the speculative bubble. He contended that if pension fund trustees had exercised appropriate judgment in a timely fashion, the bubble could have been contained. In a related vein, the Myners' (2001) report on UK institutional investors and pension fund trustee decision-making suggested that trustees lacked the expertise necessary to make independent judgments in the face of the influence of consultants and the financial services industry. And yet, throughout the industry, an often-heard lament is the risk aversion of fund trustees; sophisticated risk-management strategies are often eschewed in favor of convention.
Inertia seems commonplace.
In this paper, part of a larger project devoted to pension fund governance, I explore the problem of pension fund governance focusing upon the internal governance of pension funds given the scope of trustee discretion and responsibility. Implied by discretion is a supposition that trustees have considerable expertise whereas the reality is, at best, a world characterized by trustee competence and, at worst, amateurish confusion. Absent 3 /. As Williamson (1996, 56) observed, in theory the principal-agent problem and the moral hazard problem are closely related (when we combine self-interest with the asymmetrical distribution of information). Even so, in reality they are separable in that the scope of discretion depends upon the governance of the principal-agent relationship while the costs of trustee decision-making are borne, more often than not, by beneficiaries. There are many agents in financial markets, inside and outside of pension funds. At the same time, it is not always clear precisely who are the principals-plan sponsors, trustees, and plan beneficiaries and retirees can all claim to be heard in this respect (see Black 1992) .
trustee expertise, governments may be tempted to regulate the actions of plan officials in ever finer and more comprehensive detail. In doing so, I suggest that the tension between discretion and regulation is actually a dispute about the nature of decision-making in general and the prospects for trustee expertise in the context of financial risk and uncertainty. As is apparent from previous work, I argue that trustee competence is more likely than trustee expertise in these circumstances; expertise suggests a quality decisionmaking rarely achieved by most people.
In the next sections of the paper, I look at the form and functions of pension funds. As intimated above, the pension fund institution is an unusual institution when compared with much of continental Europe. Its functions follow its historical form, with due regard to its evolution over the 20 th century. Thereafter, I look more closely at the relative status of competence and expertise before moving on to consider Rawls' (1954) classic paper on rule-based decision-making. This allows us to re-consider the virtues or otherwise of procedural as opposed to substantive measures of trustee decision-making. To sustain my argument, I refer briefly to the path-breaking work of Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and his colleagues on heuristics and short cuts. In the penultimate section of the paper, I look once again at the governance of contractual relationships arguing that pension funds must develop the institutional form and expertise consistent with their reliance upon consultants and the fund management industry. Unfortunately, recent commentators on the topic tend to rely on idealized models of the trust institution and trustee decisionmaking; in the end, I argue that better governance demands a different institutional form than that inherited from the 19 th century.
This paper develops these arguments with respect to internal governance (the principalagent problem). In the following paper (Clark 2004) , I look closely at the regulation of plan governance (the moral hazard problem), noting the evolution and development of different regulatory regimes used to manage the issue. In total, these two papers provide a critical perspective on the problem of pension fund governance relevant to the AngloAmerican world of public and private pension systems.
Pension fund form and functions
For F. W. Maitland, one of the leading legal historians of the nineteenth century, the trust institution had a unique place in English law and statute. He noted, moreover, that the trust relationship was neither a contractual relationship nor a strictly commercial relationship-it was (and is) a form of obligation.
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Pension funds inherited from English common law and the trust institution their governance procedures. Much has been written about this institution, its significance for Anglo-American commercial and financial systems (Langbein 1997) , and its significance for the evolution of private retirement income systems over the last 50 years or so (Hawley and Williams 1999) . Although now just one element in a comprehensive web of nation-state statutory and market regulation, it remains an important reference point in setting the roles and responsibilities of pension fund trustees (Ellison 2003) . It provides justification for trustee discretion in the interests of beneficiaries' welfare subject to the public interest in the equitable treatment of beneficiaries. At the same time, the trust 4 /. Here, I refer to his essays on trust, the state and the corporation published in the first decade of the 20 th century recently collected and edited by Runciman and Ryan (2003) . /. Obligation refers to a social claim on private agents to act properly-a normative imperative that may be defined by law but could be just a moral standard. Whether private agents act in accordance with an obligation is open to scrutiny and, at the limit, may be enforced by sanctions. However, I do not believe that an obligation is necessarily defined by its sanctions. Like Johnson (1991, 134-135) , I would argue "among the characteristic features of obligation is the idea that the performance of obligation is conceived to be a matter of legitimate interest and concern of others, whether they be members of some immediate group or community, or of humanity generally." institution has no equivalent in much of continental Europe; it requires a stretch of the imagination to equate trustees' responsibilities for beneficiaries' welfare to fathers' responsibilities for their family welfare (as in France). In fact, the trust institution is an important element in observed systematic differences between whole countries' legal systems and financial systems (see La Porta et al. 1997 on the global map of financial systems and their rather different regulatory regimes).
At the same time, we have shown that pension funds are hardly transparent organizations governed without fault or favor by trust and statute (Clark 2004) . In fact, there remain systemic problems of asymmetrical information that work against the efficacy of fund governance (compare with Jensen 2000) . Trustee intentions are difficult to observe, the interests of plan administrators and service providers are not always apparent, and the costs of market failure are, too often, borne by those that should otherwise benefit from pension fund decision-making. In this respect, pension funds are organizations like other organizations with shortfalls in governance and regulation thereby being vulnerable to the principal-agent problem and the moral hazard problem. See Clark (2000 Clark ( , 2003b on the scope and significance of these issues for the Anglo-American and continental European circumstances. As a consequence, there is a significant premium associated with the proper internal governance of pension funds; that premium can be priced as beneficiaries' welfare but can also be priced as the value of innovation in the design of pension benefit systems and the investment of pension fund assets.
The trust institution provides pension funds with a generic form. But as we know, there are all kinds of pension funds: some are governed by a single trustee, some are governed by sponsor-nominated trustees, some are governed by a mix of sponsor and beneficiary representatives, and some include independent and professional trustees. There are also public and private funds, single and multi-employer-sponsored funds, craft, union, and services by third-party agents. Benefit adjudication functions may include the determination of eligibility against plan criteria, the resolution of difficult cases, and the enforcement of procedures regarding the interests of plan sponsors and beneficiaries. As for asset-management functions, these may include asset-liability matching and asset allocation (in DB plans) and the evaluation of investment product providers and advice for plan participants on their investment options and policies (in DC plans).
Whatever the functional performance of funds, it is apparent that funds have considerable discretion and responsibility in executing these functions. Plan participants are, more often than not, participants by virtue of their employment contract; in most cases, plan participation is a condition of employment. 6 In the few countries where a market exists for pension participants to switch between plan providers, it is not clear that switching decisions are consistent with the time horizon over which the relative virtues of 6 /. Mandatory plan participation is often encouraged by government regulation and tax benefits (see Bateman et al. 2001) . In some countries, however, employees are given the option to opt-out to another pension benefit provider at the time engagement. In the UK, it is not obvious that the opt-out option has been beneficial to those that have taken the option; plan participation is often more cost-effective than any similar benefits available in the private insurance market. In any event, stability of plan membership is one condition for minimizing administrative costs.
competing plans should be considered. It is also apparent that plan participants rarely if ever play an active role either in the governance of pension funds or in the scrutiny of administrative and trustee decision-making. Even when plan participants are adversely affected by specific actions and policies, few participants appeal. When they do appeal, the relevant procedures are obscure, cumbersome, and over-whelmed by the language of the plan covenant. Third-party appeal procedures are similarly problematic and time consuming. Finally, it is clear that collective action by plan participants regarding plan governance has proven very problematic. The costs of such action are prohibitive. As a consequence, prior membership of an employee representative group such as a union is an important way of mobilizing plan participants and beneficiaries.
Exit, voice, and loyalty-conventional mechanisms used in governing the principal-agent relationship-are rarely if ever directly available to plan participants. Trustees may be "representative" of plan participants but are not directly accountable in the sense we associate with representative democracy. Indeed, Maitland argued that the trust institution was conceived, as it was, precisely to avoid the need for on-going close scrutiny and regulation of agent decision-making.
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Codes of conduct
Given lack of direct accountability, it is not surprising that the regulation of pension fund tasks and functions is an important issue. Elsewhere, I look at the "external" regulation of funds emphasizing moral imperatives, legislation, and market mechanisms (Clark 2004 public sector pension fund intervention on issues related to corporate governance and global standards of behavior have prompted industry commentators to raise exactly the same questions about the governance of pension funds (and especially the role of political appointees on trustee boards) (Clark and Hebb 2004) .
Unlike the corporate arena, however, it is very difficult to design and implement a single pension fund code of conduct; as noted above, pension funds come in many different shapes and sizes recognising, no doubt, the historical legacy of English common-law, another, the implied relationship and apparent overlap between these two types of regulatory instruments suggests a common concern for the financial performance and stability of these types of institutions. However, common concern does not exhaust the interests of the constituencies served by these different types of regulatory regimes.
Indeed, given the debate in Europe over the proper role and status of private pension funds, the OECD guidelines can be seen as part of a larger agenda aimed at encouraging
European pension "reform" and institutional innovation (as illustrated by the blue-print for pan-European pension institution published by the European Federation for Retirement Provision 2003).
In large part, the OECD guidelines have a significant normative quality being focused upon the proper organisational form of pension funds and their accountability. While not expressed as such, we can identify three core principles underpinning the OECD guidelines. In the first instance, the guidelines are conceived to ensure that pension fund decision-making is consistent with the terms and conditions of the pension plan covenant or mandate. Here, there is a concern for the interests of the plan sponsor and beneficiaries. In the second instance, the guidelines encourage the design and implementation of coherent internal rules and procedures. Here, there is a concern with the formal structure of decision-making implying logic and order rather than arbitrariness. In the third instance, the guidelines suggest that the organisation of pension funds must be compatible with high standards of behaviour. Probity and professional standards are the issues, in this regard. These three principles consistency, coherence, and compatibility-are, at base, all about ensuring that pension funds are managed and organised according to recognised standards of behavior.
In more detail, the OECD guidelines recommend that pension funds are governed by recognised statutes, by-laws, rules and regulations that provide for (amongst other functions) the monitoring and oversight of administrative decision-making. It also recommends high standards of behaviour, indicating that those responsible should be as much as possible fully informed about the nature and consequences of their decisions consistent with their responsibilities. At times, the guidelines suggest a need for high levels of professionalism and expertise and that pension funds should seek appropriate advice external to the fund. Reporting should be accurate, timely, and clear in a manner consistent with full disclosure to plan stakeholders. The guidelines recommend the appointment of external auditors, actuaries, and custodians such that there are independent checks upon plan solvency, financial integrity, and pension benefit security.
In sum, the OECD guidelines suggest that pension funds should be rationally organised rather than being subject to the whims of plan officers or the fait of plan sponsors. In the UK, in the wake of the inquiry into Robert Maxwell's diversion of the Mirror Group's pension assets, the Pensions Act of 1995 went some way to require rules and procedures so as to sustain the integrity of the trustee decision-making process.
There are, however, three basic questions that may be raised about the comprehensiveness of these guidelines. Most importantly, there is an ambiguity at the very heart of these guidelines: recognising that private pension plans have sponsors and beneficiaries, the guidelines are silent on their respective powers and responsibilities.
Furthermore, the guidelines are all about establishing and maintaining pension funds as whole organisations protected from the pernicious interests of insiders and outsiders.
Again, if this is to be the case, what are the powers of pension funds in relation to their sponsors and beneficiaries? This issue comes into play, most obviously, in relation to plans that offer defined benefit pensions. In this case, plan sponsors may pay a high price indeed for their separation from pension fund decision-making in the interests of sustaining coherence and compatibility. Likewise, in other cases such as defined contribution plans, where beneficiaries carry the risk of benefit value they may pay the price for coherence and compatibility.
Implied by the guidelines, moreover, is an assumption that the formal organisation of a pension plan according to the principles of consistency, coherence, and compatibility are sufficient to drive its functional performance. On the face of it, this is a remarkable assumption. 9 It may be true if functional performance is measured in terms of the cost effectiveness of administrative and service-related tasks measured against industry standards. Cost efficiency is a most important criterion by which to judge performance even if comparable data is difficult to obtain (especially in a world where industry providers bundle together services). If apparently self-evident in terms of the economic theory of institutions (see Jensen 2000) , it ignores the reality of transaction costs, multiple and inconsistent objectives, and a lack of clarity in large organisations between the means and ends for any particular task and function. Of course, greater efficiency is possible and desirable. But organizational form is one component amongst many in determining institutional performance (March 1994).
9
/. This is most apparent when considering the failure of formal mechanisms of corporate governance and the related external audit agents used by institutional investors over the 1990s to assess corporate risk. See Coffee (2003) on the limits of such "gatekeepers" in relation to the Enron debacle. He noted that not withstanding their reputational capital, "professional gatekeepers do acquiesce to managerial fraud" (p. 14).
At the same time, the guidelines are clear about the need for responsible plan officials to obtain, where necessary, the expert advice needed to make better decisions. As with many codes of conduct governing corporate boards of directors, the OECD guidelines recognize that pension fund officials and board members may not have the specialist skills or expertise available in the financial services industry. This is especially true for some functions rather than other functions: investment management including strategic and tactical asset allocation requires a level of expertise and experience that is in very short supply in the academic world and industry let alone private pension funds (see Campbell and Viceira 2002) . It is clear, moreover, that the connection between fund governance and investment decision-making in the context of risk and uncertainty is quite problematic. The OECD guidelines are properly vague about this particular issue not withstanding the fact that investment decision-making is as important for fund sponsors and beneficiaries as cost effectiveness in the provision of member services.
Trustee expertise and competence
In previous sections, we analyzed plan officers' discretion and responsibility in managing pension plans. The presumption in favor of plan officers means that a great deal is expected of their decision-making capabilities. As I suggest in this section, there are two rather different views about this matter. Before proceeding, however, we should be clear about the assumptions we might make about rationality-a core concept in social science theory and a crucial behavioral anchor in studies of the performance and structure of financial markets (see Houthakker and Williamson 1996 and Litterman et al. 2002) . In a related move, Williamson (1996) assumed economic agents to be intentionally rational rather than ipso facto rational in the strong sense associated with much of neo-classical economic theory (compare Jensen 2000) . This definition is owed to Herbert Simon (1982) and suggests that rationality is a social practice subject to cognitive limits and the vagaries of the environment in which decision-making takes place rather than a universal once-and-for-all state of mind. Moreover, emphasis upon intentionality implies deliberate planning and the possibility that decision-making may improve over time. If being an "expert" is so important, what is meant by the terms "expert" and "expertise"?
The Myners report is not entirely clear. But in discussion with UK industry insiders, policy makers, and pension fund representatives it has been suggested experts should have four qualities: 1. high levels of formal education, 2. professional qualifications, 3.
task-specific training, and 4. significant experience. These four qualities are generic in that they are neither particular to the pension fund sector nor the investment services industry-they are the qualities of an expert whatever their occupation and industry.
None of these qualities are quickly acquired. In combination, they require time, effort, and resources. Further more, to be an expert requires continuity of occupation, the incremental accumulation of relevant knowledge, and its application to related problems and issues over a long period of time. Most troubling, it would seem that few people are truly experts and very few people under the age of 40 years could be experts. Not is a supposition that, where it matters, only expert decision-makers will survive market arbitrage and competition. Survival of the fittest is the mantra (see Alchian 1950) .
surprisingly, in many cases formal education and professional qualifications may be deemed sufficient to compensate for the lack of experience.
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Being an expert, however, need not translate directly into expertise. Wagner (2002, 57) suggests that expertise is performance-related with respect to problem solving in specific settings. Summarizing the literature, he suggested expertise has four cognitive attributes: "1. Experts spend proportionally more time assessing the problem and less time solving it, compared to novices who do just the opposite. 2. Experts recognize and categorize problems on the basis of deeper principles, whereas novices recognize and categorize problems on the basis of surface features. 3. Experts are able to perceive large patterns of information quickly. 4. Experts have superior memory, both short-and longterm, for problem-relevant information." In essence, a person's problem-solving ability can be measured, assessed, and evaluated over time against accepted benchmarks of performance. As in completing crossword puzzles, each attribute can be practiced, improved, and honed to perfection. We can judge who is, and who isn't, good at problem solving in specific contexts. Expertise combines cognitive attributes with costeffectiveness and consistency over time assuming that deeper principles and calibrated experience allow individuals to adapt quickly and efficiently to changing circumstances and new situations.
Are plan officers experts if judged against the 4plus4 model of expert qualities and attributes presented above? Myners and many in the Anglo-American financial services industry have no doubt about the answer to the question: too few, given the importance of their tasks and responsibilities. At the same time, there are many plan tasks and functions few of which demand the statistical and pattern-recognition skills associated with investment management (Bunt et al. 1998) . Experience in personnel management, dispute resolution, and rule interpretation may well be just as important. In this respect, there are often significant differences between sponsor-nominated and member-11 /. This is certainly common in the investment management industry given the proliferation of professional certificates and accreditation boards. See, for example, the web site of the UK Society of Investment Professionals, a member of the Association for Investment Management and Research. These institutes oversee "the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) qualification, a globally recognized professional qualification." http://www.uksip.org nominated trustees in terms of their expert qualities and attributes. In a survey of recently appointed pension plan trustees under-taking training by the UK NAPF, it was found that many sponsor-nominated trustees had at least the first two expert qualities and were familiar in their own professional lives with some of the attributes associated with effective problem-solving. Member-nominated trustees were rarely as skilled although they may be, by virtue of their experience, familiar with the problems of personnel management. In our survey, neither group had the substantive knowledge or the experience industry observers claim are so important in expertise.
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The available evidence would suggest that plan administrators and trustees are less skilled than their peers (advisors, service providers, and perhaps even some regulators).
The fact that plan administrators are paid substantially less than those who perform similar functions in large financial services companies suggests that there is an unequal distribution of administrative and financial skills across the industry. And the fact that pension fund trustees are hardly ever compensated in proportion to their responsibilities suggests that their motives are quite different than industry service providers.
Considering that pension fund trustees are rarely appointed for their expert qualifications and attributes in pension fund management and investment, it would appear that few plan officers would qualify for the 4plus4 model of expertise. Only in the largest corporate pension funds dominated by sponsor-nominated trustees and the knowledge and skills of corporate treasury departments might the 4plus4 model be realized. Short of replacing nominated trustees with a cadre of independent professionals appropriately compensated for their responsibilities, the 4plus4 model remains an abstract ideal (compare with Horack et al. 2004 ).
The alternative model is the competency model associated with the market for financial services: that is, a model of pension fund governance that combines the available skills of administrators and trustees with well-defined rules and procedures for decision-making. In this model, funds should take advantage of the mix of skills available within the institution recognizing the different skills needed for the effective performance of the various functions of a fund and the need to locate responsibility with well-managed subcommittees. Fund performance would depend, in part, on the extent to which internal competence allows for the recruitment of expert advice from industry consultants and financial service providers subject to appropriate safe-guards regarding conflicts of interest and independence. At the limit, the competency model puts the weight of governance on the governance of contractual relationships and implies that a crucial test of fund competence is its ability to hire and fire industry service providers according to independent standards of performance. The competency model of pension fund governance implies that plan officers are best seen as consumers of expertise rather than the locus of expertise. At the same time, the 4plus4 model of expertise provides plan officers with a set of criteria by which to judge those that offer their services.
At one level, the competency model is a version of what often happens in the industry (Clark 2000) . At the same time, the competency model makes four presumptions: first, plan officers should be chosen, in part, for their skills in relation to the mix of functional responsibilities; second, internal rules and procedures should be well-conceived with respect to the execution of management of tasks and functions; third, where-ever possible, tasks and functions should be out-sourced to industry providers according to independent competitive standards of performance; and fourth, purchase of external services should be governed by selection criteria and assessment procedures based upon high standards of expertise.
Decision-making, rules and procedures
Considering their importance for pension fund decision-making, we should be clear about the nature and significance of rules and procedures. In doing so, we should recognize that our lives are governed by rules. Most obviously, there are rules for driving a car (the side of the road we drive upon etc.). More subtly, there are rules for conducting economic and social relationships. Some rules are formal and are codified in law. Others are informal and are part of customary practice learnt over time through context-specific experience. In many ways, the rules governing everyday life are rarely, if ever, explicitly considered. More often than not, such rules are fully integrated into behavior and are only considered if, for some reason, they fail to work. On the other hand, the rules and procedures governing pension fund decision-making and their relationships with external service providers have a deliberate or an explicit quality to them such that their design and implementation is (or should be) continuously monitored.
One (strong) theory of rules would have it that their design and implementation are determined by the expected value of desired outcomes. By this logic, one rule or one set of rules may be judged better than others by virtue of their consequences. Following Rawls (1954) , a number of implications follow from such a theory. In the first instance, it is supposed that we make each and every decision on its merits, applying the available skills and experience in such a way that we maximize the results of our actions. In the second instance, it is commonly supposed that people with similar skills and experience sharing similar goals would decide issues in much the same way. So, for example, if pension fund boards are comprised of trustees with the same expert qualities and attributes and are similarly committed to maximizing beneficiary welfare then decisionmaking should be unproblematic at least with respect to the shared criteria used to make decisions. Thus, it is arguable rules develop over time such that as each issue is confronted it is simultaneously placed according to past decisions and decisions made in past cases are applied as rules to current cases.
In this theory of decision-making, expertise is crucial. The four attributes of expertise identified above have important roles to play in locating each and every issue with respect to inherited rules-assessing the problem, categorizing the problem, placing the problem in relation to recognized patterns and processes, and using knowledge of the past to adjust the decision-making process are all important for the integrity of rules. Over time, with a sequence of issues more or less the same, it is supposed that the classification of issues becomes quicker and the application of rules to those cases becomes more or less automatic. We would expect that both the speed of decision-making and its efficiency improve over time as the rules themselves become more coherent and better defined with respect one another. This is a most demanding theory of rules. Consider the following objections, relevant to the issue of pension fund decision-making. Underpinning the whole logic of the argument is an assumption of homogeneity both with respect to the skills and expertise of trustees and their commitment to a single objective function (maximizing beneficiary welfare).
While such an assumption may be necessary for the logic of governance, it seems quite unlikely given the nature and composition of many pension funds. As well, the importance of information processing with respect to case recognition in relation to a priori defined patterns presupposes that trustees have the knowledge, time, and resources to undertake such analysis. More likely, the only groups with the requisite knowledge, time, and resources are the external service providers. Even expert pension fund trustees are likely to depend upon others for this kind of analysis hence the necessity of governing the principal-agent relationship. Furthermore, the formation of rules out of cases presupposes the stability of the underlying processes. Uncertainty may cloud judgment, introducing doubt about the placement of cases against pre-existing patterns and ultimately the allocation of issues to their relevant rules. Cases and rules may be lost in ambiguity, conflict and doubt.
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Most importantly, the strong theory of rules verges on the super-rational. In allocating cases to rules, in revising and adapting rules in relation to new cases, and in judging the utility of rule behavior against their consequences remarkable assumptions have to be made about the robust rationality of trustees and their agents. Implied is a process of comprehensive and continuous assessment of each and every issue ignoring resource 13 /. In these circumstances, conflict between those deemed responsible may become endemic to the trust institution prompting the invention of rules and the arbitrary allocation of cases in order to sustain the social if not economic process of decision-making. See Clark (2000) on the collegial logic of collective decision-making.
constraints, cognitive limits, and the need for timely decision making. In this idealized world, there are no systematic psychological biases (for example, risk aversion) or cognitive traps (for example, herd instinct and market speculation). Against all the psychological evidence to the contrary, trustees are assumed to follow issues in all their complexity through to conclusion; the real world of decision-making is largely ignored (see Gigerenzer et al. 1999) . It is a theory of rule making that would disqualify most trustees from the decision-making process; indeed, it would seem to disqualify almost anyone from serving on trustee boards. In the end, this theory of rule-based decisionmaking is as profoundly paternalistic as it is idealistic.
A rather different view of the nature and significance of rules and procedures would have it that they are social assets, embedded in institutions, and driven by the need to economize on resources and time. By this logic, rules and procedures are task-related and develop as institutions develop in an incremental fashion around the execution of those tasks and functions. More often than not, economic agents rarely take the time to design or remake inherited rules; at most, they adapt or adjust existing rules within the constraints of their organizations. Where rules and procedures are imposed upon institutions, as is often the case of statute-based rules and regulations, economic agents may have to deal with overlapping and even conflicting sets of rules that are neither coherent with respect to one another nor unambiguous as to their ultimate objectives. At the limit, rules and procedures are a bureaucratic skeleton resistant to the kind of rulerationality sketched above but nevertheless valuable for the ways in which they define expected practice.
14 As in the strong theory of rule making, I assume that the utility of rules has to do with their consequences. At the same time, if we assume that economic agents in general and pension plan trustees in particular have limited knowledge, time, and resources then rules allow economic agents to take short cuts-to economize on the costs of decision-making by providing an a priori reference point for issues as they arise. They are used, more often than not, as automatic filters for classifying the significance or otherwise of those issues. This is despite the fact that the consequences of such shortcuts may be seen, in a larger context, less than optimal. In fact, this suggests that the social value of rules and procedures is to be found not in their precise utility on a case-by-case basis, but in their generality. Being 80 per cent right may be sufficient for economic agents to hold to a set of rules recognizing that evaluating exceptions is a time-consuming process. Only when exceptions accumulate and a pattern is revealed in those exceptions might those that rely on rules look to revising the rules themselves.
Of course, the reform and revision of rules is more problematic than the strong theory of rules would seem to suggest. In many cases, rules and procedures are social practices Most importantly, working by inherited rules and procedures maybe a refuge for pension plan officers that are best characterized as competent rather than expert in their fields.
The challenge, in this context, is to design a set of rules and procedures in the public domain that require pension plan officers to interrogate the efficacy of their decisionmaking practices whilst, at the same time, being sufficiently flexible to accommodate local innovations that go beyond common practice. More often than not, rules and procedures establish minimum standards of competence; however, those rules and procedures must also be able to accommodate changing circumstances that demand expert qualities and attributes. Too often, public rules and procedures and only penalize non-compliance when they should also reward innovation outside of the inherited framework of rules and procedures.
Governance through contract
Rules are oftentimes effective but may promote less than optimal results. As well, there is a sense in which the object of such governance instruments are defined benefit plans.
This is most apparent in the Myners' report where UK Treasury concerns about pension plans' lack of expertise in areas such as asset allocation and private equity partnerships were given a great deal of weight. But, of course, the numbers of DC plan participants out-weigh DB participants and the rate of DB to DC conversions appears to be increasing not withstanding the significance of DB plan assets (Clark 2003a) . Embedded in the DC world is a model of plan governance that relies more upon contract in the market for financial services than upon plan expertise and the internal provision of tasks and functions. In this respect, contract buttressed by fiduciary duty represents an alternative model of plan governance. 15 More over, given the problems apparent in many pension plans regarding competence as opposed to expertise, one option is to simply transfer to consultants and then to service providers the shortfall in requisite expertise.
There is a massive literature on contract, governance and organizational form (see generally Masten 1996 and Williamson 1985) . I do not intend to rehearse well-known claims and counter-claims regarding the virtues of contract for the design of institutions.
Rather, we look at a simple and conventional view of governance through contracts and then suggest how that view should be modified in the light of the particular circumstances of many pension funds. As is well appreciated, the neo-classical theory of contract assumes there are many buyers and sellers in the market place, full information is available to market agents, there are negligible transaction costs and there is nothing that would lock-in parties to second-order contracts. In effect, this is a world of discrete exchange that can be costlessly executed and revised (indeed revoked) if better opportunities are available. There is considerable debate about the empirical and logical plausibility of this model (see Epstein 1999 and compare with Trebilcock 1993 .
For our purposes, it represents a conceptual reference point if not exactly current practice.
Less discussed in the literature, is the competence of contracting parties. There has been considerable discussion regarding the fairness of contracts where one party is deemed less competent by virtue of the asymmetrical distribution of information (Cartwright 1991) . Similarly, there has been a long history of state intervention designed to protect parties to contracts against the costs of coercion, collusion, and exploitation (Atiyah 1979) . But, in relation to pension fund governance, while these issues may be important on a case-by-case basis, it should be apparent that pension fund trustees must often defer to the expertise of other parties. Even if service providers are bound by fiduciary duty, in many cases pension fund trustees do not have the expertise necessary to question the expert judgment of service providers-the only option available to many trustees are questions relating to the efficacy and efficiency of the procedures whereby service providers fulfil their tasks. In this respect, consultants have a vital role in representing trustees' best interests at the nexus of contracts. This contract is the most important contract, one that is characterised by continuity (over many cases) and longevity (over time) given the specificity of plan circumstances and interests.
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In these circumstances, any contract between a plan and its consultants must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of long-term commitment and the inability of trustees to observe the relationships between plan consultants and financial service providers. There is a subtle and difficult to calibrate trade-off between discounting the value of a contract given its long-term commitment against the unknown opportunities for immediate reward offered by the financial services industry for specific deals. Indeed, to reap the benefits 16 /. Klein (1996) provides a useful case study of significance and possible consequences of institutional specificity for the formation of contracts. Most importantly, specificity may result in the vertical integration of financial functions and the formation of long-term contractual relationships that may effectively capture of those on either side of the contractual divide (see below).
of contract as a system of pension plan governance it would seem necessary to have different types of contracts-some relational and some discrete-using the prospect of switching between providers and varying the terms of contract as mechanisms for disciplining potential and actual service providers. One response to these problems of governance may be to introduce third party auditors and advisers. But, as we have seen in recent scandals of corporate governance, there is no guarantee that auditors will pickup conflicts of interest if secrecy between conspiring partners is the organising principle.
Transparency is an essential ingredient in governing such relationships (Hebb 2004) .
At the core of this model of pension fund governance is the management of contract.
This requires systems of over-sight and assessment that are comprehensive and detailed.
There is, however, an alternative. Instead of governing external contracts, pension funds may wish to keep internal their tasks and functions governing their own employees through personnel contracts and the like. A variety of arguments may be made in favour of this approach. One is that internal contracts may be cheaper because employees may be willing to take lower salaries in return for tenure of employment. It is apparent that the high cost of industry service providers is due, in part, to the cost of employees recognizing that most trade-off high current salaries against limited job tenure. Of course, there are dangers in such compensation strategies including the selection bias implied regarding the risk adverse nature of employees in different organizations.
Another argument in favour of such an approach would invoke the mission of pension funds: unlike many industry service providers, pension funds' have a beneficial ethic or moral mandate. This may allow for the co-existence of internal (less expensive) contracts with external (more expensive) contracts since the moral mandate is a form of selfgovernance shared by employees (Clark 2004 ).
Here, of course, there is an issue of scale: that is, few pension funds are large enough in terms of their asset base to be able to provide both the routine and the highly specialized tasks and functions at a competitive performance-related price. Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of pension funds whether defined benefit or defined contribution are very small, this option is practically irrelevant to most funds. Only in circumstances where funds amalgamate together and form their own service providing organizations may small funds be able to take advantage of their moral mandate. This is, of course, precisely the option favored in a number of countries including Australia and The Netherlands.
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Even if these larger organizations do not internalize all tasks and functions, larger size allows for the employment and retention of highly qualified and experienced plan officials evening-out the distribution of expertise between funds, consultants and service providers (Clark 2003b) . Missing in the UK and the US, it appears, are adequate incentives for fund amalgamation and collective governance.
Conclusions
Maitland's history of the trust institution stretches back over many centuries. When comparing it to Germanic legal traditions, Maitland emphasized its uniqueness against continental traditions and the special place it occupied relative to the Crown and corporation. For Maitland, the trust has many beneficial features not least, of which are the separation between trustees' own interests and the interests of beneficiaries. He also suggested that it was a site of innovation especially with respect to financial institutions and instruments. Likewise, legal scholars such as Langbein (1997) argue that the trust institution is crucial in differentiating Anglo-American financial systems from their European cousins. These ideas find common cause amongst those that advocate the relevance of trust-based pension fund institutions for European private pension and retirement income systems over the coming decades. It is arguable that idealization is a necessary element of any comparative analysis of nation-state economic and financial institutions (Allen and Gale 2000) . But in this case, there are increasing doubts about the capacity of pension funds to operate as equal players in the market for financial services.
Doubts have been raised about the internal structure and management of pension funds; not withstanding widely recognised case of outstanding pension fund management, it would appear that the vast majority of such funds are poorly organised relative to beneficiaries' welfare. In any event, to the extent to which they rely upon external service providers for the execution of their many tasks and functions, it would seem that the vast majority of pension fund trustees defer to the expertise of service providers. In both cases, Maitland's 19th century ideal has been overtaken by the increased complexity of fund tasks and functions and the astonishing growth of the financial services industry and its instruments over the past 50 years. In the UK, the Myners report argues that if funds are to fulfil their obligations to beneficiaries and if they are to take an active role in the financial services industry commensurate with their significance in terms of total assets then the governance of pension funds must improve along with the knowledge and expertise of pension fund trustees. As is widely appreciated in the industry, most pension funds lack even a rudimentary knowledge of advanced financial instruments.
In this respect, moves to "reform" pension fund governance have taken a variety of forms. Most obviously, codes of practice have encouraged the development of management systems more consistent with pension plan tasks and functions. Codes of practice have added a level of specificity to governance not apparent in the generic qualities attributed to trust institutions. I have suggested that codes of practice are both valuable for their contribution to the cost-efficiency and consistency of decision-making and for their value as benchmarks in evaluating the functional performance of plans.
Arguably just as important is the quality of internal decision-making distinguishing between trustee expertise and competence. This is most obvious when considering pension fund investment management functions, but can be extended to consider any issue involving judgement about beneficiaries' welfare. One response has been to invest a great deal in internal rules and procedures invoking tests of efficacy and efficiency.
But, as we noted, rules and procedures are more than instruments for promoting economic welfare (in general) and beneficiaries' welfare (in particular)-they have a vital social role in coping with limited resources in the context of risk and uncertainty.
But too many "solutions" do not confront the most important issue-that is, the relative power of pension funds and their officers in the market for financial services. In that regard, I would suggest that by the only real solution to apparent problems of governance and lack of expertise within pension funds is the transformation of those institutions into organisations that have sufficient internal resources that would allow them to employ professional managers and advisers. This suggests that pension fund governance is an issue of size and scale as much as it is an issue of proper rules and procedures, competence and expertise. One of the lessons to be learnt from the Australian and Dutch experience is that large, industry-based pension funds are better able to compete in the marketplace for tasks and functions than smaller single-sponsor pension funds. This does not mean that large multi-employer pension funds ought to be financial institutions in their own right; size and scale provides pension fund trustees a choice about the nature of their organisational form recognising the costs and benefits of internal provision as opposed to being at the nexus of contracts with external providers.
Poor organisational systems combined with a palpable lack of expertise makes many pension funds a soft target for unscrupulous financial service providers. Furthermore, at a time when large public sector pension funds have played a significant role in promoting reform of corporate governance, the prospect of other large financial institutions being formed to occupy similar positions in the market for financial services will surely not be welcomed by entrenched corporate management. And yet, this is exactly what is implied by government rules and regulations that to require pension funds and related institutions to vote their proxies. At present, however, the small size and lack of expertise that characterises most pension funds means that this policy is likely to remain the terrain of only the biggest funds. Only if governments promote the formation of larger multiemployer pension funds will the apparent deficit in pension fund expertise be addressed in a manner consistent with the conscientious exercise of their responsibilities. Similarly, only this solution is consistent with the financial service industry's interest in promoting financial innovation.
